STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: SUPPORTING NATIONAL STRATEGY THROUGH STRENGTHENING OUR ALLIES

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ABSTRACT

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Security Assistance is an essential element of U.S. Foreign
Policy and is a vital component of the United States National
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Since the end
of World War II and the subsequent emergence of the United States
as the world's remaining super power, our nation has assumed a
leading role in promoting peace. However, this role as the
world's policeman is extremely costly in terms of personnel and
dollars. Since the end of Desert Storm, U.S. military services
have been reduced by nearly forty percent. Our overseas presence
has been reduced by fifty percent and will be further reduced.
This reduced power projection force, coupled with the current two
major regional conflict (2MRC) strategy, means that we cannot
fight alone. Security Assistance programs provide the combat
multiplier needed to insure success in the next war.

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: SUPPORTING NATIONAL STRATEGY THROUGH STRENGTHENING OUR ALLIES

Introduction

Terms such as **attack, defend, screen,** or **secure the objective** have deep professional meaning. They can be easily visualized by soldiers. They are words of honor. They are terms that military scholars and tacticians have dissected many times and in many ways. But what type of a term is **Security Assistance**? It is not heroic, nor does it stir up memories of "Old Baldy" in Hohenfels or the "Valley of Death" at the National Training Center. It is a term universally misunderstood by soldier, statesman, and John Q. Public alike. **Security** relates to defense, protection, safety, warranty, and guarantee. **Assistance** relates to aid, help, advise, subsidy, support and charity. Unfortunately, most Americans believe the latter connotations of "charity" accurately describe the entire security assistance program. But this is not true. To get the proper perspective, we must think of security assistance as a combat multiplier of immense and indeterminant proportions. Despite its significance, it is also one of the smallest programs in the President's budget, receiving less than one percent of the entire annual Federal budget.

Security Assistance is, in fact, an instrument of the

executive branch used to implement or influence foreign policy in the interest of National Security. This paper analyzes the role of Security Assistance as a vital segment of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

The following discussion offers an historical synopsis and a review of the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the respective regional combatant commanders in our Security Assistance policy. It will also analyze how Security Assistance relates to the ends, ways, and means of our National Security/Military Strategy. It concludes with a recommendation regarding the continuation of Security Assistance as a vital component of the National Security/Military Strategy.

Role of Security Assistance

Security assistance, as defined by Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations is:

> A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.[1]

The 1995 National Military Strategy defines security assistance as cooperative programs with allied and friendly armed forces that furnish these countries with means to defend themselves from aggression and to fight alongside U.S. forces in a coalition effort.[2] What then makes up the total program of Security

Assistance?

The evolution of security assistance has now distilled into
seven basic programs. First, Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
provide for government-to-government sale of U.S. defense
equipment. The key
to the FMS program
is the word *sale*.
It is the only
Security Assistance
program which does
not cost the U.S.
Government budget
dollars. In 1994
sales reached $13B,
with over $9B in
1995. (See Fig. 1,
Security Assistance
Programs Chart.)[3]

Security Assistance Programs

PROGRAM	FY 1990	FY1991	FY1992	FY1993	FY1994	FY1995
FMS($B)	14	23	15	33	12.9	9.1
FMF Grants ($B)	4.42	4.25	3.93	3.27	3.15	3.15
FMF Loans ($M)	404	404	345	855	770	620
IMET ($M)	47.2	47.2	44.6	42.5	22.1	25.5
PKO ($M)	32.8	32.8	27.6	39	79.4	75
EDA Grants ($M)	674	1,115	968	1,720	729	626
EDA Sales ($M)	Not tracked	126	389	445	343	199

Figure 1. Security Assistance Programs: 1990–1995

The second program, International Military Education and
Training (IMET), provides professional military training to
foreign military and civilian personnel. IMET is a grant program
providing annual military education and training to over two
thousand military and civilian personnel from one hundred plus
countries.[4] This program not only educates the personnel in
military fundamentals but it also provides students with the
opportunity to appreciate American culture and values. An

excellent example of the IMET program providing immeasurable benefit is represented by the hundreds of International Fellows that have attended the Army War College(AWC). Many of these AWC graduates have become the chief of their armed forces or heads of their respective governments.

The third program, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), is the primary military financing program. Initially FMF was designed to support the security demands of Middle East countries. FMF currently supports counternarcotics and demining efforts, while sustaining support to the Middle East countries.[5]

Fourth, the Military-to-Military Contact Program (MMCP)--a team composed of country experts-is tailored to facilitate cooperative agreements between nations. Established in 1993 to accommodate military discussions with North, Central, and Southern Europe, the program is now expanding to the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility.[6] This program laid the groundwork for the current U.S. European Command's Partnership for Peace Program.

The fifth program, Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (VPO), provides voluntary support of multinational peacekeeping operations. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorized the U.S. to disperse Security Assistance funds in support of peacekeeping operations. This program also allows the U.S. to share its security responsibilities and burdens with other nations.[7]

The sixth program, Emergency Drawdown Authorities-Grant

(EDA-G), provides assistance for international narcotics control, international disaster relief, or refugee assistance.[8] This program is a quick-action tool available to the President to assist in time of disaster or national security emergency. Recent Presidents have used this program to respond to crises in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and the West Bank/Gaza.

The final program, Excess Defense Articles-Sales (EDA-S), provides for the sale of excess defense articles as identified by the Approved Force Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock.[9] This program authorizes a free transfer of excess military items. However, the recipient country pays the packing, crating, and handling fees for the item. In addition, the items are transferred in an "as is" condition.

History of Security Assistance

Modern Security Assistance began with the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. This powerful act authorized the President to provide defense articles for foreign governments when the defense of these nations was *vital* to the security of the United States. Following this Act, during the late 1940's World War II reconstruction era, Secretary of State George C. Marshall had just returned from a trip to Moscow during which he recognized the need to enact a plan of assisting Europe back on its feet after the devastation inflicted on it from WWII. It was apparent to him that Russia, with its Communist government, was intent on infiltrating the governments of Western Europe. Thus on 5 June

1947, Secretary Marshall delivered the essence of the "Marshal Plan" to the Harvard graduating class of 1947. The Marshall Plan was one of those rare acts of statesmanship which respond to contemporary needs and determines the course of future events.[10] The Plan's philosophy was grounded in the basic Biblical beliefs of the common man: Nations in more fortunate circumstances should help those in need, provided only that they are prepared to help themselves.[11] Following its support of the Marshall plan, in 1949 Congress passed an Act known as the "Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1949". Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson praised its strategic support of the prospective allies:

> . . . the security of the United States depends primarily on our own strength, but we need all the strength we can marshal in case of emergency. The second source of strength that can be placed at our disposal for mutual defense is the strength of our allies. We cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world, nor can we rely on our own arms alone. This military-assistance program is the most realistic way in which we can begin to build up our allies so that they will be strong enough to make a real contribution to their own security and, therefore, directly to our security.[12]

These great instruments of National Security were later supplemented by the Mutual Security Act of 1953. The success of the aforementioned legislation is still debated today. However, whether they were successful or not, these legislative initiatives laid the framework for the United States Security Assistance program from 1941 to present.

Cold War Era

The Cold War Presidents of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,

Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush all used Security Assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. Although some of the administrations were more successful than others, the overriding fact was that Security Assistance was continually modified to serve vital U.S. National interests. The following brief review will highlight these administrations' uses of Security Assistance.

President Truman was the first President of what is called the Cold War era. He soon became painfully aware of the increasing Communist influence in Western Europe. His endorsement of the Marshall Plan has been described as the beginning of a new era of security assistance. It was soon discovered that the Marshall Plan would need some modifications to accommodate a changing world. Other legislative instruments were enacted to provide additional structure and form. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Initially known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1949), as we have seen, supplemented the Marshall Plan by authorizing arms sales/transfers to nations loyal to the U.S.. However, many Congressman objected to providing arms for sale and wanted to revert to pre-war isolationist ideals. However, the U.S. was now a world power—coming to be recognized as the color bearer for freedom around the world.

Eisenhower would continue waving the Stars and Stripes around the world with promises to provide needed assistance to any free nation. However, his "massive [nuclear] retaliation" policy limited the amount of funds available to support our

allies. The Mutual Security Act of 1953 put great emphasis on the reciprocity of mutual support from the nation receiving the assistance. Congressional opposition was significant, with opponents charging that the Act did not go far enough regarding parity of assistance funds. However, the Korean War and later on our support to the French in an obscure place called Vietnam would cause the security assistance dollars to expand to the highest outlay of any administration.

President Kennedy, fresh out of the starting gate, came face-to-face with the first crisis of his administration just a few months after his election. The 1961 encroachment of the Soviet Union in Berlin did not allow Kennedy any flexibility to adjust the inherited 'massive retaliation' policy or to reduce support to our allies. In reality, it had just the opposite effect. The Kennedy administration reconfirmed the nuclear retaliation position, initiated a program for conventional arms build-up, and increased the amount of assistance to our European allies. Bolstered by his Berlin success, Kennedy evoked similar policy regarding Castro's communist take over in Cuba. He initiated a program called "Alliance for Progress", which provided military and economic assistance for mutual security and to stimulate growth.

Upon Kennedy's tragic death, President Johnson continued the current Security Assistance programs at their current level of spending. However, Johnson chose to massively escalate the war in Vietnam, while he faced a new crisis in the Middle East. Billions

of Security Assistance dollars in the form of military equipment and supplies were literally poured into South Vietnam. In addition, the '67 Arab-Israeli War would put even greater demands on an already strained security assistance program.

President Nixon's success hinged on only one issue: Get the U.S. out of Vietnam. . . with dignity and honor. He certainly did the former. But whether he achieved the latter is questionable-not for debate in this paper. Nixon's legacy to security assistance is known as the Nixon Doctrine, formerly the Guam Doctrine. This policy essentially stated that the country in need of support would provide the preponderance of manpower in its own defense. To supplement this policy, Foreign Military Sales of arms climbed steadily, making billionaires of American arms merchants. Watergate forced Nixon from the White House, thrusting Gerald Ford into office.

President Ford faced a hostile Congress that was distrustful of Nixon-initiated programs. Escalating arms sales was no exception. Congress placed a limitation on the dollar value of the arms sales, sparking intense lobbying by the American arms merchants. The capstone was the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Essentially, this Act put the handcuffs on the Chief Executive's Security Assistance program. The Act strongly emphasized control of arms sales or transfers. It empowered Congress with authority to approve arms sales or transfers.

The election of President Carter, along with a Democratic Congress, supported by the existing Arms Export Control Act,

paved the road for a declining Security Assistance program.
Carter was a strong human rights advocate and worked that issue
extremely hard during his campaign. Therefore, it was no surprise
upon his election that U.S. arms sales would be curtailed. Human
rights was now a major factor in each sale of arms. However, it
was soon apparent that the restrictions placed on the sales of
arms limited the President's authority to provide support to our
closest and strongest allies. Presidential Decision Directive 13
was then enacted to facilitate the sale of arms to our allies. It
emphasized that the sale of arms should support our National
Security.

Ronald Reagan swept into office--and with him came a
resounding refocus on defense, including security assistance.
Unlike Carter, Reagan was not elected because of his position on
human rights. Reagan was elected on a 'keep America strong'
platform and on his promise to strengthen the defenses of the
country. He kept his promise. But the Reagan Security Assistance
program was somewhat of a double-edged sword. Initially,
restrictions on arms sales were nearly the same as those of the
Carter years. Later the policy was relaxed and arms were sold to
any nation that was a friend or ally of the U.S., so long as the
spirit of 'mutual defense' and our 'national security' were
foremost in the sale. However, this policy was not without
problems. The liberalized sale or transfer of weapons to third
world nations had unrecognized second and third order effects on
regional balances of power.

Post Cold War Era

George Bush has the dubious distinction of being our first post cold war President. Having served as Reagan's Vice President for the previous eight years, he sought very little change to the administration's Security Assistance policy. Security assistance remained a positive instrument of foreign policy that directly supported the country's national interests. This became very evident during Desert Shield/Storm. Assistance provided to the Persian Gulf States of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia clearly revealed the importance of supporting our allies with arms and supplies for the mutual defense of our vital interests.

Clinton Administration

"Protecting our nations's security--our people, our territory and our way of life--is my administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty."[13] This is the opening statement by President Clinton in his February 1995, A National Security and Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The President continues by stating that his central goals to support his strategy are: "to sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight; to bolster America's economic revitalization; and to promote democracy abroad."[14] The President further clarified that a strong, proactive, forward-thinking foreign policy must play a key role in sustaining his vision for America. Therefore, it is important to define his overall goals in terms of foreign policy, especially by means of Security Assistance.

First, the security of the Nation is paramount. The downsizing of the U.S. military clearly implies that alliances in a world of coalition warfare are an integral component of our national security. Therefore, a well-equipped and highly trained ally capable of self-defense or providing military support is in our national interest. Security assistance clearly provides the resources to insure success.

Second, economic well-being of this nation is sustained through the purchase of U.S. goods and services. Security assistance dollars buy American products, thereby stimulating our own growth and productivity.

Third, promotion of democracy fosters international stability and free markets; it creates the conditions for greater domestic prosperity and security. Security assistance supports this goal through peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief operations.

Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense(SecDef) has primary responsibility for implementing the United States Government (USG) Security Assistance Program. His statutory responsibilities in this area include determining what defense articles or services are available for sale or transfer abroad and implementation of the military assistance programs. Department of Defense (DoD) also has significant input into the Department of State policy formulation process for security assistance. Significantly, DoD

does not provide funds for Security Assistance Programs. Department of State provides all the dollars for security assistance. The mission to direct, administer, and supervise the execution of military assistance programs for DoD, along with primary responsibility for policy and management oversight, belongs to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The Joint Staff then implements the various programs. The Joint Staff's specific responsibilities include: coordination of security assistance with U.S. military programs and providing the SecDef with military advice; recommending military force objectives, requirements, priorities, and potential security assistance recipients; and assessing the impact of Security Assistance programs on other U.S. programs and defense readiness. The geographic Commander-in-Chiefs' (CINCs) responsibilities include: making recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) and SecDef; ensuring coordination of regional security assistance matters with U.S. diplomatic mission(s) and DoD components; and providing evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD overseas Security Assistance organizations and programs.

The Chairman's National Military Strategy.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy of *Flexible and Selective Engagement*[15] has been designed to carry out the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and to comply with the recommendations in the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review. The National Military Strategy directs the

Armed Forces' support of the National Security Strategy of *Engagement and Enlargement.* This support is carried out through the dual National Military Objectives (NMO): *Promote Stability* and *Thwart Aggression*[16].

'*Stability*' is maintained by peacetime initiatives or a strategy of Peacetime Engagement[17]. Security Assistance is one of six components of Peacetime Engagement that support the National Military Strategy of "Flexible and Selective Engagement"[18].

The National Military Strategy states,

> Security Assistance involves the selective use of cooperative programs with allied and friendly armed forces that furnish these countries with the means to defend themselves from aggression and to fight alongside U.S. forces in a coalition effort.[19]

The five regional Commanders-in-Chief have the responsibility to confer and plan with prospective coalition partners to determine what requirements are needed and what can be provided--these are not always the same.

Regional Security Assistance

The fourth player is the Unified Commander or Regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), regional CINC's had little say on Security Assistance programs in their area of responsibility. GNA authorized the regional CINC to present supporting arguments, thereby stressing vital programs to Congress. So, when a CINC speaks, Congress must listen and heed his advice. Early 1990 CINCCENT, General Schwarzkopf, spoke

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to Congress about a potential adversary's increasing access to long-range missiles, coupled with chemical and biological weapons creating a "new and alarming lethal dimension [in] to the region . . . . The U.S. is providing too little security assistance to even meet the basic needs of several strategically important nations."[20] (Fig. 2)

Who are better qualified than the CINCs to testify before Congress on regional awareness? The CINCs deserve and have earned the right; they should be heard. All five regional CINCs have included strong security assistance

1995 Regional Security Assistance Programs			
	FMF	FMS	IMET
EUCOM	61.2	56	60
CENTCOM	38.5	15	4
SOUTHCOM	.1	2	19
PACOM	.1	26	13
ACOM	.1	1	4

Chart displays percent of FMF, FMS, and IMET dollars by Command

Figure 2. 1995 Regional Security Assistance Programs

language in their respective regional security strategy assessment. Therefore, let's consider their various security assistance strategies.

Atlantic Command (ACOM) is the smallest recipient of security assistance funds. However, ACOM cites Security Assistance as an example of active engagement short of armed conflict that provides a foundation for establishing conditions to promote the economic and political stability which will allow

democracy to flourish.[21] During FY 95, ACOM received $3.77M in FMF funds, of which $3M went to support the operation in Haiti. Eighty percent of the IMET funds, $652K, was obligated to technical support, rather than professional military education. Despite a small security assistance outlay, ACOM remains steadfast to the principle of conflict prevention.

Southern Command(SOUTHCOM) is also suffering from a decline in Security Assistance dollars. The figures range from $1365.8M in 1990 to a low of $49.3M in 1995[22]-a reduction of 97% in Security Assistance funding. The simple reason is that Cuba is no longer a significant threat, so most dollars in this region now support counter-drug operations, rather than security assistance. But SOUTHCOM is not sitting idly in the matter of security assistance. Strategy 2001: Regional Cooperative Security is being developed which will encompass a total package of Security Assistance initiatives. The scope of 2001 includes conventional defense support packages, counter-drug, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian/ disaster relief, and infrastructure/environmental programs.[23] This very aggressive initiative, however, must face the reality of a lack of dollars, which will remain a tremendous obstacle. Without a significant threat in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, security assistance will, unfortunately, continue to decline.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy of *warfighting* and *people* includes strong support for regional security and stability through the strength of our allies.[24] PACOM is second

only to the European Command in foreign military sales. Thus a large number of our regional security partners are equipped with U.S. equipment. In addition, a thriving IMET program provides professional military education to reinforce U.S. tactical and strategic doctrine. Unlike SOUTHCOM and ACOM, PACOM's region is in constant turmoil. Threats from China and North Korea will continue to sustain PACOM's Security Assistance program.

The European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility includes the largest land mass and more sovereign countries than any other regional CINC. Therefore, it is no surprise that EUCOM has the largest portion of all Security Assistance programs. EUCOM's strategy is simple and straight-forward: *engaging in peacetime . . responding to crisis . . fighting to win.*[25] Security Assistance is aligned with the strategy of *engaging in peacetime*. The FMS and FMF programs exclusively support key regional security alliances. All Security Assistance appropriations, with the exception of FMF funds for Israel, are spent on U.S. goods. IMET, as in all other regions, is the most important security assistance program. The EUCOM IMET program is well grounded in the leadership of many regional partners and is now reaching out to Eastern European nations. Sharing U.S. democratic values and ideals with Eastern leaders is extremely important, especially when addressing weapons of mass destruction.

Central Command (CENTCOM) has developed a three-tier strategy for achieving regional stability. Tier I calls for each country to bear primary responsibility for its own self-defense.

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Next, if aggression occurs, friendly regional states should provide a collective defense, known as Tier II. Under Tier III, the U.S. and other allies from outside the region stand ready to form a coalition to defend common interests in the region, if necessary.[26] The three-tier strategy is supported by five pillars, one of which is Security Assistance.[27] CENTCOM relies greatly on Security Assistance to improve the security posture of the region. Security assistance also provides the means to improve the training of regional military forces, to promote interoperability, to gain access, to strengthen military-to-military relationships, and to increase over time the ability of states to provide for individual and collective defense.

Analysis

The following analysis consists of a critical evaluation of the Security Assistance program using the *ends*--the final objective, or what; the *ways*--consisting of the concept, or how the end will be achieved; the *means*--the resources required to achieve the ends; and the *risk*--the cost if the end is not achieved.

The Ends

The end or objective is initially stipulated as a goal, or something to be attained. Therefore, this analysis begins with specification of the core ends--goals or objectives-which insure supportability from one level to the next in the following top-

down hierarchical display of the current U.S. National Strategy:

National Security Strategy [objectives]:
   Enhance U.S. Security
   Promote Prosperity at Home
   Promote Democracy Abroad[28]

National Military Strategy [objectives]:
   Promote Stability
   Thwart Aggression[29]

Peacetime Engagement [objectives]:
   Demonstrate Commitment
   Improve Collective Military Capabilities
   Promote Democratic Ideals
   Relieve Suffering
   Enhance Regional Stability[30]

Security Assistance [objectives]:
   Form and Preserve Coalitions
   Allied Self Defense
   Deter Aggression
   Economy of US Force[31]

The Ways

The key '*ways*' of achieving the ends/objectives of security

assistance are provided through three primary programs: Foreign

Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and

International Military Education and Training (IMET).

Foreign Military Sales is the largest in scope of the three

Security Assistance programs (1995 $9.1B); it includes everything

from repair parts to major end items. It also includes personnel

services support or in-country subject matter expert advisor

teams--the teams may be military, civilian, or a mix . Do not be

misled: The U.S. Government is not in the business of selling

weapons or parts for profit. However, FMS is not a give-away

program. Therefore, FMS facilitates the sale of arms from U.S.

providers, commercial contractors, or the U.S. military to

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selected foreign purchasers.

The second key program of Security Assistance is Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF consists of grants, not requiring pay-back, and loans, which must be paid back. FMF is the primary financing program of security assistance. This program provides allies with the ability to finance military defense related articles to enhance their sovereign security and in turn promote regional stability, thereby satisfying a key U.S. National Military objective: promote stability.

Third, and maybe most important, is International Military Education and Training (IMET). This professional development program is designed to support foreign military and civilian personnel attending U.S. military schools. The IMET program provides the foreign students training on current U.S. military doctrine and exposes them to American culture and values. Although this program receives less funding than FMS and FMF (1995: $25.5M), do not underestimate its value. Sharing American values, standards and ethics, along with sharing military doctrine, is its single most important benefit. It is in direct support of the NMS objective of 'stability' and the NSS objective of 'promoting democracy'.

The Means

The 'means', those resources required to support the 'ways', are the key ingredient to the entire process. The 'means' will dictate the degree of success in achieving the 'ends'. Dollars

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and people are the core resources for all Security Assistance

programs. The American public would be amazed to know that less

than one percent of the Federal Budget supports the entire

security assistance program. However, due to the demand for more

budget cuts, dollar resources for security assistance will also

be reduced, thus increasing the *risk*.

RISK

'Risk' is assessed on the basis of what will happen in the

event the 'end' is not totally achieved. In a speech to the

National Press Club, *"The Price of Leadership"*, Anthony Lake

described a world without American leadership:

>   *Ukraine, Bellarus,and Kazakhstan joined the club of
>   declared nuclear weapons states because we couldn't do
>   the deals to denuclearize them.
>   *Russian missiles were still pointed at our cities
>   because we couldn't push to detarget them.
>   *Thousands of migrants were still trying to sail to our
>   shores because we had not helped restore democracy in
>   Haiti.
>   *Nearly 1 million American jobs had not been created
>   over the last three years alone because we had not
>   promoted U.S. exports.
>   *We had paid tens of billions of dollars more and
>   suffered more casualties because we insisted on fighting
>   Operation Desert Storm against Iraq by ourselves.[32]

Example of Ends/Ways/Means

The U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND Security Assistance Program, as

shown in the chart (Fig.3), although not all encompassing, is

displayed using ends, ways, means and risk paradigm.[33] The

chart, especially in the area of risk, clearly depicts the CINC's

intent and portrays the importance of Security Assistance within

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his command. A good example of the interdependence between Security Assistance programs and the NMS/NSS objectives is the sale of the M1A2 main battle tank to Saudi Arabia. The $3B FMS program involved the sale

ENDS	WAYS	MEANS	RISK
COALITION BUILDING	MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	1000 -1500 PSNL DEPLOYED ON ROUTINE BASIS	NO SPT DURING A CONFLICT -COST OFS AND US LIVES
ENHANCE TIER I - SELF DEFENSE	TECHNICAL ASST. FIELDING TEAMS (TAFT) FOREIGN MIL SALES	46% OF WORLD WIDE SALES - AVE OF $800M/PER MONTH	INCREASED RESP FOR THE US FOR REGIONAL PROTECTION (MORE $ SPENT)
ENHANCE TIER II - COLLECTIVE DEFENSE	IMET	$3.035M FY95 IMET FUNDING	LACK OF UNITY & UNDERSTANDING OF US DOCTRINE
INTEROPERABILITY/ STANDARDIZATION	ENHANCED STANDARDIZATION INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING	JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES	NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE, OR MAKE COORDINATION
ACCESS	MIL TO MIL CONTACT TEAMS	LNO PROGRAM EST. W/ ALLIED COUNTRIES	NOT ABLE TO HAVE FWD DEPLOYED FORCES/FAC.

Figure 3. U.S. CENTCOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

321 M1A2 main battle tanks to the Saudi Land Forces. IMET supported the sale with a tailored training program, then several mobile training teams assisted in fielding the tank in Saudi Arabia. The sale also supported the NMS/NSS objectives: Enhance U.S. Security--created a strong regional ally; Promote Prosperity--salvaged a sinking tank industry and created jobs; Promote Democracy--built trust and confidence in America; Promote Stability--provided peacetime deterrence; and Thwart Aggression--provided a force of the most lethal main battle tank in the world to oppose Hussein's Iraqi invasion.

Conclusion/Recommendations:

Security Assistance is a critical peacetime program that directly supports the National Military Strategy and National

Security Strategy goals and objectives. We now operate in a giant global web of entanglement, so each U.S. initiative is open to criticism at home or abroad. Such events as the end of the cold war, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the current situation in Bosnia demand a strategy of global peacetime initiatives. The National Military Strategy essentially states that direct conflict will be our final option. Therefore, peacetime initiatives must be undertaken to reduce the risk of direct conflict. Security Assistance, if used wisely, has the potential to be a peacetime combat multiplier of immense proportion. It provides a means to strengthen our friends and allies, thereby sustaining regional stability, providing self-defense, and promoting global peace. Finally, the relatively small amount of money allocated for Security Assistance is disportionate to the degree of benefit received by this country. The time has come to recognize that Security Assistance is an essential element of a strong National Foreign Policy. Our strategic planners must keep Congress focused on its importance and not let it ebb away. Is Security Assistance a vital component of our National Security Strategy and our National Military Strategy? There is absolutely no doubt: Security assistance is the tool that can make the difference between defeat and victory.

ENDNOTES

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